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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a theoretical discussion of the forward premium anomaly. We reformulate the 
well-known Lucas (1982) model by allowing for the existence of monetary policy regimes. The 
monetary supply is viewed as having two stochastic components: a) a persistent component that 
reflects the preferences of the central bank regarding the long-run money supply or inflation 
target, and b) a transitory component that represents short-lived interventions. To generate agents 
forecasts, we consider two scenarios: a) consumers can distinguish the permanent and the 
transitory components of the money supply, and b) consumers can observe only historical series of 
the aggregate monetary supply and face a signal-extraction problem. We simulate the model from 
a carefully estimation for the parameters involved in the model. Numerical simulations reveal that, 
under complete information, forward unbiasedness cannot be rejected at conventionally significant 
levels. However, when learning about monetary policy is incorporated, the forward bias can be 
reproduced without artificially assuming an unreasonable degree of risk aversion. 
 
Keywords: forward bias, monetary policy, regime shifts, learning 
JEL Classification: C22;F31;F47. 
 
                                                 
∗The authors wish to thank Oscar Jorda, A. Taylor, Alfonso Novales, seminar 
participants at UC Davis, XVII Finance Forum and the 4th CSDA International 
Conference on Computational and Financial Econometrics for helpful comments and 
suggestions. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant 
ECO2009-10398, the Xunta de Galicia through grant 10PXIB300177PR, the Fundación 
Ramon Areces through its program of Research Grants in Economics is gratefully 
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Dpto. de Finanzas y Contabilidad, Universitat Jaume I. Email: lafuen@cofin.uji.es.  
2
 Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Universidad Complutense 
3
 Dpto. de Economía Cuantitativa, Universidad Complutense. 
1 Introduction
According to the hypothesis of uncovered interest rate parity, expected changes in the spot exchange rates
should be perfectly and positively correlated with the current forward premium. Therefore, the domestic
currency is expected to depreciate whenever domestic nominal interest rates exceed foreign interest rates.
However, this hypothesis has been empirically rejected in a large number of studies (see, Froot and Thaler
(1995), Lewis (1995), Bansal and Dahlquist (2000), Tauchen (2001), Sercu and Vinaimont (2006), among
many others), and sometimes a negative correlation has also been detected (see Backus et al. (1995) and
More and Roche (2002, and 2007)). This empirical feature is known as the forward premium anomaly and
has direct implications for expected returns from international currency deposits. When nominal exchange
rates are negatively correlated with the lagged forward premium, a non-negative interest rate di¤erential is
associated with an expected depreciation of the currency for the high interest rate country.
This puzzle has been interpreted in several ways in the literature. From a theoretical point of view,
although a substantial number of studies have addressed the ability of general equilibrium models that build
up on Lucas (1982) to explain the forward premium puzzle (see, for example,Canova and Marriman (1993),
Bekaert (1994), Engle (1996), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and More and Roche (2002), they either
require unreasonable risk aversion parameters or an incredibly volatile consumption processes. Relative to
empirical work, recent studies focus on the non-stationarity and long-memory features of the exchanges rates
and the forward premium (see, for example, Baillie and Bollerslev (2000), Tauchen, 2001, Maynard (2003,
2006), Maynard and Phillips (2001) and Maynard and Lu (2005), among many others). In sum, a good
deal of empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to analyzing the forward premium anomaly, but
a conclusive understanding of the issue continues to elude researchers. The anomaly is still regarded as a
relevant puzzle in international nance.
In this paper, we propose a general equilibrium model to explain the forward bias for foreign exchange.
The model is based on the Lucas (1982) model and is similar to that proposed in Dutton (1993). While
the recent paper of Verdelhan (2011) provides an explanation based on the existence of external habit
preferences and rational expectations, the work of Chakraborty and Evans (2008) suggests that the learning
theory approach to expectation formation in the foreign exchange markets should be considered a serious
contender in future empirical work on the forward-premium puzzle1 . These authors use a basic canonical
monetary exchange-rate model, but they anticipate the impact of learning will remain prominent in more
complex exchange-rate models that allow for risk aversion, incomplete information processing or heterogenous
expectations. Following this intuition, our paper tries to provide additional insights on the forward premium
bias from the perspective of general equilibrium theory.
In particular, we consider a modied version of the Lucas model in which incomplete information arises
when agents must form expectations of future monetary policy actions by solving a signal extraction problem.
1As Krugman said (The New York Review, 54(2), February 2007 ): "But Friedman never went there. His reality sense
warned that this [rational expectations] was taking the idea of Homo economicus too far".
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Also, our modelling is similar in spirit to that of Mark and Mohb (2007). These authors investigate the idea
that the forward premium anomaly is caused by unanticipated central bank interventions in the foreign
exchange market, and propose a theoretical model in which the violations to uncovered interest parity do
not reect unexploited prot opportunities or systematic risk. The numerical simulations of their model
show that the forward premium anomaly intensies during periods of active interventions by central banks.
In accordance with Mark and Moh (2007), our model mainly departs from the Lucas model in that
individuals can observe the historical sequence of money supply, but they cannot distinguish whether a
monetary shock implies a regime shift or a transitory intervention. Monetary policy is specied as having
two components: one is determined at each time period by the prevailing monetary regime and reects a
particular target of the central bank regarding the money supply or ination; the second represents short-lived
interventions. Economic agents consequently face a signal-extraction problem through a learning mechanism
that allows monetary shocks to be decomposed into estimated transitory and permanent components.
Consequently, a broad set of scenarios can be simulated in order to explore potential explanatory factors
for the forward bias. Our main result is that when agents are capable of anticipating monetary policy shifts,
that is, when they can exactly identify the transitory and persistent components of monetary disturbances,
the forward unbiasedness hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional signicance levels. However, when
agents need to solve a nontrivial signal extraction problem on the basis of the past history of the monetary
policy, a signicant downward forward bias systematically appears. These results do not require preferences
with external habits and hold without any need for high risk aversion and for alternative degrees of substi-
tution between domestic and foreign goods. Also,as expected, extremely high risk aversion intensies the
downward bias.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3
discusses the implications of the model using estimated parameters from US and the EMU. Finally, Section
4 summarizes and provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our modelling strategy is to extend the well-known Lucas (1982) model by allowing for the existence of
regime changes in monetary policy. We will consider two scenarios: in the rst one, structural parameters
concerning the evolution of money supply over time are assumed to be known. By contrast, we also consider
the more realistic case in which agents need to learn from current history in order to forecast future monetary
policy. We start by presenting our version of Lucasmodel and describing the assumed structure for monetary
policy.
Let Xt and Xt denote the exogenous endowments of consumption goods in the domestic and foreign
countries. Endowments are stochastic, and their natural logarithm follows an autoregressive process with
Normal innovations:
2
Xt = XtXt 1, (1)
Xt = XtX

t 1, (2)
where:
0@ r lnXt
r lnXt
1A =
0@ (1  X) ln X
(1  X) ln X
1A+
0@ 11 12
21 22
1A0@ r lnXt 1
r lnXt 1
1A+
0@ X;t
X;t
1A ; (3)
with ,
0@ X;t
X;t
1A  N
0@021;
0@ 2X;t X;tX;t
2X;t
1A1A.
This way, similarly to Lafuente and Ruiz (2006), the potential correlation between real shocks in the
domestic and foreign countries is explicitly taken into account. Let us denote X ;X the linear correlation
coe¢ cient between these two shocks.
2.1 The consumers problem
The optimization problem for the home consumer is:
Max
fCD;t ;CF;tg
E0
1X
t=0
t
1
1  
h
[ (CD;t)

+ (1  ) (CF;t)](1 )=   1
i
(4)
s.t. PD;tCD;t + StPF;tCF;t  Yt;
Yt =Mt + Tt 1
St   Ft 1
Ft 1
,
where CD;t and CF;t are the consumption levels of domestic and foreign goods at time t ,  > 0 is the
relative risk aversion coe¢ cient, 11  is the elasticity of substitution with  < 1, while parameter  2 (0; 1)
represents the weight of each consumption good in the utility function. As to the budget constraint, PD;t
and PF;t denote the prices of domestic and foreign goods at time t, Yt is the total income in period t, St is
the spot exchange rate, Ft 1 is the price of forward contract, Tt 1 is the respective amount of its currency
that the home country sold forward in the previous period. The money supply (Mt) plus the prots on each
forward currency trade in period t equals total home income. A similar optimization problem is solved by
the foreign consumer:
Max
fCD;t ;CF;tg
E0
1X
t=0
t
1
1  
h

 
CD;t

+ (1  )  CF;t(1 )=   1i (5)
s.t. PD;tCD;t + StPF;tC

F;t  Y t St,
Y t =M

t + T

t 1
St   Ft 1
Ft 1St
.
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2.2 Optimum good choices.
In any period t the home consumer chooses levels of CD;t and CF;t that solves (4). First order conditions
for choice of CD;t and CF;t are:
[ (CD;t)

+ (1  ) (CF;t)]
1 
  1 (CD;t)
 1   tPD;t = 0, (6)
[ (CD;t)

+ (1  ) (CF;t)]
1 
  1 (CF;t)
 1   tStPF;t = 0, (7)
Yt   PD;tCD;t   PF;tStCF;t = 0, (8)
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier. From equations (6) and (7), we obtain:
CF;t =

(1  )PD;t
PF;tSt

CD;t, (9)
where  = 11  denotes the elasticity of substitution. Using (8) and the budget constraint, the demand
function for the domestic and foreign good is as follows:
CD;t =
YtP
 
D;t
P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  , (10)
CF;t =

(1  )PD;t
PF;tSt
 YtP D;t
P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  . (11)
Using a similar procedure, the demands for the foreign country can be found, that is:
CF;t =

(1  )PD;t
PF;tSt

CD;t, (12)
CD;t =
Y t StP
 
D;t
P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  , (13)
CF;t =

(1  )PD;t
PF;tSt
 Y t StP D;t
P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  . (14)
2.3 Forward Contracting
As well as the allocation of current resources between the two goods, the home consumer chooses the level
of forward contracting in period t. The Euler condition is:
Et

t+1
t+1

St+1   Ft
Ft

= 0 (15)
where Et denotes the conditional expectation based on the information set available in period t. From (15):
Et [t+1St+1] = FtEtt+1
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and taking into account (6) the value of the forward exchange rate at time t consistent with consumers
optimal choice is:
Ft =
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1
i
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1St+1
i . (16)
A similar expression applies for the foreign country:
Ft =
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1
i
Et
h
@Ut+1
@CF;t+1
1
PF;t+1St+1
i . (17)
2.4 Equilibrium in the Goods Market
In equilibrium, the total endowment of the two goods must be equal to the consumption of each good in the
two countries, that is:
CD;t + C

D;t = XD;t, (18)
CF;t + C

F;t = XF;t. (19)
Equilibrium prices of the two goods depend on the home and foreign money supplies as well as on their
endowment. Taking into account that a) money is worthless after each period and b) each countrys good
can only be purchased with that countrys currency, the following cash-in-advance spending constraints must
hold:
PD;tXD;t =Mt, (20)
PF;tXF;t =M

t . (21)
Also, in equilibrium, the following relationship between home and foreign derivative positions holds:
Tt =  T t .
2.5 Monetary policy
Following Andolfatto et al. (2004), we assume that the money supply at the beginning of period t comprises
two stochastic components: one component which reects the main regime which is determined by the
long-run monetary policy target, and the second component being the short-run error made in control of
monetary aggregates by the central bank. For the home country, we have:
Mt = MtMt 1; with lnMt = ln M + zt + ut,
where Mt denotes the home money supply,  is the average rate of growth of the natural logarithm of the
money supply, and zt and ut denote the regime and transitory component, respectively. We also assume
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that the regime component of the monetary policy to remain constant for a relatively long time period and
a new regime appears only occasionally. Thus, the time evolution of zt can be expressed as follows:
zt =
8<: zt 1, with probability pgt, with probability 1  p, where gt  N  0; 2g .
Parameter p reects the expected duration of any given regime, or alternatively, the persistence of the
regime. Given that zt represents the long-run monetary guidelines of the central bank, it is expected that
such persistence would be fairly high. Parameter 2g reects the potential size of the regime shift. The
transitory money growth component of the ut is assumed to follow a standard AR(1) specication:
ut = ut 1 + at,
with 0 <   1 and at  N
 
0; 2a

. The variable ut can be interpreted as the outcome of a monetary
intervention in nancial markets as a reaction to shocks occurring in the world economy. In a similar way,
the dynamics of the monetary policy of the foreign country is described as follows:
Mt = MtM

t 1; with lnMt = ln M + z

t + u

t ,
zt =
8<: zt 1, with probability pgt , with probability 1  p, where gt  N  0; 2g .
ut = 
ut 1 + a

t ; 0 <   1; at  N
 
0; 2a

Domestic and foreign monetary shocks on the transitory component ( at and at ) may be correlated, with
correlation coe¢ cient aa .
2.6 Spot exchange rates
Using the budget constraints and equations (18) to (21), the analytical expression of the equilibrium spot
rate is:
St =
1  


XF;t
XD;t
"
Mt
Mt
. (22)
2.7 Expectations and parameter estimation
To obtain simulated equilibrium time series for spot and forward exchange rates, there are two aspects of
prior work that we need to deal with: a) the specication of parameter values and b) the computing of
expectations.
Since we are trying to asses whether learning is an explaining factor for the forward bias in our model, we
consider two frameworks for generating expectations concerning monetary policy. Firstly, let us assume that
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consumers in the economy know the structural parameters. From now on we will refer this case as "complete
information". In this case, consumers can perfectly distinguish the transitory and persistent components of
money supply. For example, in the home country agents forecast the future money supply according to the
following expression:
Et

ln

Mt+1
Mt

  ln M

= Et (zt+1 + ut+1) = pzt + ut.
In the more realistic case of incomplete information, consumers are unable to exactly determine which
policy regime applies at any given time, that is, they ignore how to decompose historical realizations of money
supply into permanent and transitory drivers. This implies that agents need to solve a signal extraction
problem which determines how agents learn using the new information that arrives at the market to estimate
eventual regime changes in the monetary policy.
To compute expectations of zt+1 and ut+1 conditional to the information set available at time t under
incomplete information researchers can use a state-space representation for the growth rate of the money
supply above-mentioned in a similar way as in Andolfatto et al. (2004). For example, in the case of the
domestic country:
yt+1 = H
0
t+1
t+1 = Ft + ~t+1
where:
yt+1 = ln

Mt+1
Mt

  ln M ,
t = (zt; ut),
~t = (Nt; at), where Nt =
8<: (1  ') zt, with probability pgt, with probability 1  p
F =
0@ ' 0
0 
1A, j'j 2 (0; 1)
H
0
= (1; 1)
However, the use of the Kalman lter for the foregoing state-space representation is non-optimal because
the noise vector ~t is not Gaussian. To overcome the absence of normality we use an alternative state-space
representation that is equivalent in mean and variance to the representation considered in Andlfatto et al.
(2004)2 . For example, for the domestic country we have:
yt+1 = H
0
t+1 (23)
2A detailed explanation on this alternative representation can be found in Lafuente et al. (2011).
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t+1 = Ft +GSt+1Ett+1 +St+1t+1 (24)
where:
yt+1 = ln

Mt+1
Mt

  ln M ,
t = (zt; ut),
t = (gt+1; at+1),
F =
0@ ' 0
0 
A, j'j 2 (0; 1)
H
0
= (1; 1)
GSt+1 =
0@ !St+1 0
0 0
1A, !St+1 =
8<:
1 '
p if St+1 = 1;with probability p
 '
p if St+1 = 0;with probability 1  p
,
St+1 =
0@ St+1 0
0 0
1A, St+1 =
8<: 0, if St+1 = 1;with probability p1 if St+1 = 0;with probability 1  p ,
where St+1 = 1 reects no regime shift, that is, no change for the current monetary policy target. On the
contrary St+1 = 0 corresponds to the case of changes in the policy target.
Now the state equation requires the use of state-contingent matrices, and explicitly incorporates the
role of economic agentsexpectations in learning about monetary policy-making. Interestingly enough, this
representation allows us not only the optimal use of the Kalman lter as the signal extraction procedure
to obtain y^t+1jt, but also to perform the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters involved in the
monetary policy. Note that y^t+1jt = z^t+1jt+ u^t+1jt = E^t
h
ln

Mt+1
Mt

  ln M
i
, where E^t denotes the Kalman
lter estimation for the expectations of the growth rate of the money supply when agents have incomplete
information.
3 Numerical results
The next table summarizes the point estimates (standard deviations are in brackets) for all the relevant
parameters involved in the monetary policy based on the maximum likelihood estimation procedure using
the state-space representation that we previously mentioned in subsection 2.7. From quaterly data of M1
for the US and the EMU covering the sample period from 1980:Q1 to 2011:Q1 and 1991:Q1 to 2011Q1,
respectively we obtain:
US p = :8695[:0674]  = :6103[0:0517] 2g = :0128[0:0058] 
2
a = :0048[0:0002]
EMU p = :8528[0:0056]  = :7902[0:0647] 2g = :0104[0:0044] 
2
a = :0038[0:0001]
These probabilities imply a mean duration of shifts of about 8 years. Once the transitory components
are estimated, we can compute the correlation coe¢ cient coe¢ cient aa = 0:3188.
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Given that we are going to simulate quarterly data, we consider a discount factor of 0:99, a commonly
used value in the real business cycle literature. As to the weight of each consumption good in the utility
function we set  = 0:5. Concerning the risk aversion we follow Campbell and Cochrane (1999) by setting
 = 1:5. We also use time series data to estimate the parameters involved in the time evolution of real
endowments. Using the common sample (1991:Q1 to 2011Q1), the estimation of the bivariate VAR for the
growth rate of GDP leads to the following point estimates:0@ r lnXt
r lnXt
1A =
0@ 0:0032
0:0006
1A+
0@ 0:5258  0:0521
0:2883 0:3883
1A0@ r lnXt 1
r lnXt 1
1A+
0@ ^X;t
^X;t
1A
with ^X;t = :0060, ^X;t = :0059 and the correlation between the home and foreign real shocks X ;X =
0:1742. Table 1 shows the baseline parameterization that we consider. We simulated the model 1,000 times
generating observations for each time series with the same sample size of the largest dataset used in the
estimation. Economic agents need to solve a signal-extraction problem for estimating the two individual
components of the money supply. We assume that they face this problem by constructing an optimal
forecast based on all the relevant information. Each simulation is performed under two scenarios: complete
and incomplete information. The scenario of complete information corresponds to the case when agents can
perfectly identify permanent and transitory components of monetary policy. In contrast, under incomplete
information agents face a nontrivial signal extraction problem because they can observe only an aggregated
noise.
The solution of the model requires the evaluation of highly non-linear expressions, that precludes the
possibility of an analytical solution. Appendix 1 provides a detailed explanation of the solution method
proposed to obtain simulated equilibrium time series for spot and forward exchange rates.
To test the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate as a forecast of the future spot rate, following
Fama (1984), the econometric specication most commonly used in the literature is the following:
st+k   st = +  (ft+k   st) + t+k
where st+k is the log of the nominal exchange rate in time t+ k, ft+k is the log of the k-period forward rate
traded at time t and t+k is a random error.
To clearly identify the ability of the model to reproduce the forward bias we not only present the median
estimate and the condence interval at the 10% signicance level, but also the density functions of the
estimated slopes with the 1,000 regressions for each scenario (complete and incomplete information). Figure
1 summarizes the results obtained from the baseline parameterization. It can be observed that the existence
of learning clearly produces a downward bias in the estimated slope coe¢ cient. On the contrary, under
rational expectations the estimated slope is close to one. Indeed we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
 = 1 against the alternative  < 1 at the 10% signicance level. However, under incomplete information
the null is rejected. Figure 2 shows an example of how the adjustment takes place under rational expectations
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and bounded rationality using the baseline parameterization. The di¤erent paths might be interpreted as
a consequence of higher dispersion beliefs. When agents need to disentangle monetary shocks into the
permanent and transitory components. In summary, what the model shows is that, given that learning
is time consuming, the price discovery role of forward market is not in the way expected with rational
expectations.
To analyze the sensitivity of our results we also present numerical simulations by changing some para-
meters from the benchmark setting. In particular, we check the robustness of our results to changes in the
curvature of the utility function (parameter ) and the degree of substitutability (parameter ).
Figure 3 presents the results whith higher risk aversion, in particular for  = 4. As is apparent, the nature
of our results from the baseline parameterization remains qualitatively unchanged. Now we reject forward
unbiasedness not only under incomplete information, but also under bounded rationality. The downward
bias is now greater, regardless the scenario considered. When risk aversion is high a small consumption shock
has a large impact on the change in marginal utility. Under such conditions agents prefer a more persistent
comsumption, which leads to higher persistence in the forward premium and therefore a regression imbalance,
since the regressor is a long memory process while the regressand is clearly an I(0) variable.
Figure 4 shows the results with  =  1:0, that is, considering a lower degree of substituion between
domestic and foreign goods. Again the distribution of the slope coe¢ cient under complete information
departs from the one corresponding to the case of incomplete information. Similar to the baseline scenario,
the null hypothesis of  = 1 against the alternative of  < 1 cannot be rejected at the 10% signicance level
under complete information, while it is rejected when learning takes place.
To reinforce the idea that learning should be taken into account in order to better understanding forward
bias when monetary transmission is not similar, we nally simulate the model with a completely new scenario:
specically we consider a) very low persistence in the transitory components ( =  = 0:1), b) 2g = 
2
a =
2a , and c) 
2
g  2g :The rest of the parameters in both countries taking bechmark values. Chart 4
shows the results. As can be observed, with a standard value for risk aversion the model clearly shows the
relevance of learning. Given that regime shifts are quite di¤erent in the two countries, the updating process
of expectations under learning is much slower. The robustness of our ndings is reected by the stability of
the percentile that corresponds to the unitary slope in the density function under incomplete information,
that, regardless the parameterizacion setting considered is at least the 90th percentile.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored an explanation for the forward bias in foreign exchange markets based on a stochastic
and dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates regime shifts in monetary policy. Based on the
well-known Lucasmodel, the main novelty lies in the existence of a representative agent that needs to
estimate the current state of monetary policy from analyzing the past history. The money supply is viewed
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as having two stochastic components: a) a persistent component that reects the preferences of the central
bank regarding the long-run money supply or ination target, and b) a transitory component that represents
short-lived interventions or errors in controlling the money supply. In addition the model is formulated to
allow for di¤erent weights for each consumption good in the utility function and the possibility that home
and foreign real shocks as well as transitory monetary shocks in the two countries may be correlated.
We present results from numerical simulations focusing on the role of the monetary policy. In particular,
we consider two scenarios: a) complete information, with consumers that can perfectly distinguish the
transitory and persistent components of money supply, and b) incomplete information: in this case consumers
are unable to perfectly determine which policy regime applies at any given time, and they face a signal-
extraction problem.
We simulated the model initially using a baseline parameterization which is based on a careful calibration
from quarterly data for the US and the EU. Numerical simulations suggest that the need for learning can
be a factor explaining the forward bias. The intuition is clear.
The hypothesis of rational expectations would require that market participants be homogeneous in their
formation of expectations. But this assumption implicitly assumes that agents do not make systematic errors
when forecasting the relevant variables and parameters (for example the probability of regime shift). However
neither complete information nor perfect foresight are features of nancial markets. And when learning about
monetary policy does not take e¤ect immediately, our results reveal that a signicant downward bias arises.
Given that learning is time-consuming, the price discovery role of the forward market is not in the way as
expected under rational expectations.
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6 Appendix 1
This appendix contains the explanation of the solution method used. From the optimality conditions, we
obtain the following set of equations:
St =
1  


XF;t
XD;t
"
Mt
Mt
(A1)
PD;t =
Mt
XD;t
(A2)
PF;t =
Mt
XF;t
(A3)
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
(1  )PD;t
PF;tSt

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
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P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  (A6)
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 hMt + T t 1 St Ft 1Ft q StP D;ti
P 1 D;t +

1 


(StPF;t)
1  (A7)
T t 1 = Tt 1 (A8)
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Et
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C 1D;t+1
 
CD;t+1 + (1  )CF;t+1
 1 
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Using equations (A1) to (A8), equations (A9) and (A10) can be expressed as follows:
Ft =
Et

g1
 
Ft;Mt;Mt+1;M

t+1; XD;t+1; XF;t+1

Et

g2
 
Ft;Mt;Mt+1;Mt+1; XD;t+1; XF;t+1
 (A11)
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Et
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Ft;Mt;Mt+1;M

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
Et

g4
 
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 (A12)
where functions gi () ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are:
14
g1 = 	
 
D
"
+ (1  )

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )# 1   1
XD;t+1
Mt+1

(A13)
g2 = 	
 
D
"
+ (1  )

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )# 1   1
 (A14)
XD;t+1
Mt+1


1  

XD;t+1
XF;t+1
 Mt+1
Mt+1
g3 =

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )( 1)
XF;t+1
Mt+1

 (A15)
	 F
"
+ (1  )

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )# 1   1
g4 =

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )( 1)
	 F
"
+ (1  )

XF;t+1
XD;t+1
(1 )# 1   1
 (A16)
XF;t+1
Mt+1


1  

XD;t+1
XF;t+1

being:
	D =
Mt+1 + Tt
"
1 


XF;t+1
XD;t+1
 Mt+1
M
t+1
 Ft
Ft
#
Mt+1
XD;t+1
 

Mt+1
XD;t+1
 
+

1 

 h
1 


XF;t+1
XD;t+1

Mt+1
Mt+1
Mt+1
XF;t+1
i1  (A17)
	F =
Mt+1 + Tt
"
1 


XF;t+1
XD;t+1
 Mt+1
M
t+1
 Ft
Ft
#
1 


XF;t+1
XD;t+1

Mt+1
Mt+1

Mt+1
XD;t+1
 

Mt+1
XD;t+1
 
+

1 

 h
1 


XF;t+1
XD;t+1

Mt+1
Mt+1
Mt+1
XF;t+1
i1  (A18)
We use linear and log-linear approximation of functions gi () ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4 around the estimated trend
using the Hoddrick-Prescott lter for XD;t+1, XF;t+1, Mt+1 and Mt+1. Substituting such approximant
functions into equations (A11) and (A12), we obtain a system of two equations with two variables (Ft; Tt) as
a function of the following expectations: Et

ln

Xt+1

, Et

ln

Xt+1

, Et

ln

Mt+1

, Et

lnMt+1
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.
Expectations for endowments are always computed as Et

ln

Xt+1

= (1  X) ln (X) + 11 ln
 
Xt

+
12 ln

Xt

and Et

ln

Xt+1

= (1  X) ln (X) + 21 ln
 
Xt

+ 22 ln

Xt

for the domestic and
the foreign country, respectively. However, for the monetary policy we consider two alternative scenarios:
a) Complete information: in this case, expectations are computed as follows:
Et

ln

Mt+1

= ln M + pzt + ut, and Et

ln

Mt+1

= ln M + p
zt + 
ut
b) Incomplete information:
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Et

ln

Mt+1

  ln M

= y^t+1jt = z^t+1jt + u^t+1jt, and Et

ln

Mt+1

  ln M

= y^t+1jt = z^

t+1jt +
u^t+1jt by applying the Kalman lter using equations (23) and (24).
Once the relevant expectations have been computed either under complete or incomplete information,
the above system for (Ft; Tt) can be solved.
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Appendix 2
Table 1. Baseline parameterization
Home country (US) Foreign country (EMU)
X 0:5258 X 0:3883
X 0:0060 X 0:0059
g 0:0128 g 0:0104
a 0:0048 a 0:0038
 0:6103  0:7902
Correlations: X ;X = 0:1742; aa = 0:4243
Parameter to control the elasticity of substitution:  = 0:50
Discount factor:  = 0:99
Weight of each consumption good in the utility function:  = 0:50
Curvature of the utility function:  = 0:50
Probability of regime shifts: 1  p = 1  0:8695; 1  p = 1  0:8528
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Figure 1. Density functions of simulated slopes. Baseline parameterization
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information incomplete information
0.8719 0.5742
90-th quantile
Complete information incomplete information
1.2676 0.9412
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information incomplete information
64% 91%
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Figure 2 Adjustment of forward rates under rational expectations and bounded rationality
Figure 3. Density functions of simulated slopes. Sensitivity to parameter  ( = 4:0)
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Figure 4. Density functions of simulated slopes. Sensitivity to parameter  ( =  1:0)
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information incomplete information
0.8798 0.6261
90-th quantile
Complete information incomplete information
1.2813 0.9826
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information incomplete information
62% 92%
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Figure 5. Density functions of simulated slopes. New baseline parameterization
Note: the dotted line corresponds to complete information
Median slope
Complete information incomplete information
0.9486 0.4503
90-th quantile
Complete information incomplete information
1.2398 0.9668
th-quantile that corresponds to the unitary value
Complete information incomplete information
57% 91%
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